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Labour contributions provided by villagers are central to government policy on rural 
infrastructure development in Vietnam. This brief report is an initial step to assess problems 
and provide analysis of the contribution system, and outline the minimum required to 
ensure that the poor access employment opportunities in local poverty reduction projects 
with equitable working conditions, participate in decisions about contribution schemes, and 
a framework that clearly outlines conditions where the poor are partially or completely 
exempted from contributing. This involves a range of issues such as improving the use of 
participatory processes, understanding the vulnerability of the poor, capacity building, 
institutional change, political will, developing the regulatory framework and planning 
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1. Introduction  
 
Labour contributions provided by villagers are central to government (GoV) policy on rural 
infrastructure development. The aim of policy and guidelines embodied in National 
Programme 135 (P135) and National Target Programme for Poverty Reduction (NTP-PR) 
is to encourage these contributions to ensure that state subsidies/grants for local 
investments can be utilized more effectively, and improve access to employment 
opportunities for the poor. However, in the provinces there are significant problems with 
the implementation of contribution schemes. They are implemented inconsistently in 
communes which results in low efficiency and very limited benefit for the poor, and, in 
some cases, their exploitation.1  
 
State subsidies and grants from National Programme 135 (P135) and National Target 
Programme for Poverty Reduction (NTP-PR) and revenue generation in communes are not 
sufficient to fund the construction and operations and management (O&M) of infrastructure 
necessary for socio-economic development2. Local contributions are required to make up 
the difference including financial, labour and in kind contributions.3  
 
Villagers are expected to contribute to a range of official and unofficial schemes: 
 
Official 
a. 10 days annually to national infrastructure projects and a flexible number of days to 
local development projects  
b. Voluntary contributions to resolve immediate problems4 
c. Donations to special funds such as flood victims and education for poor children 
                                                 
1
 See Government of Vietnam (1998a, 1998b) for more details on the National Target HEPR Programs. 
2
 In many communes, state budget only covers salaries and allowances of state, mass organisation and Party 
officials.  
3
 Evaluation of national poverty reduction program can be found in Nguyen (2003, 2005), and Nguyen et al. 
(2005). 
4
 With regard to P 135 there is considerable confusion due to the terminology and it is possible to hear the 
same term applied to many different concepts – ‘voluntary contribution’ can mean 1) paid income generating 
labour; 2) days worked as part of the nationally applied 10 day contribution; 3) voluntary or even obligatory 
unpaid labour beyond the 10 days. 
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d. Taxes and fees such as agriculture, land  irrigation and drainage 
e. User fees for health and school services   
f. Local social welfare, such as stable housing for the poor (Tinh Nghia) 
 
Unofficial5  
a. Family expenses for weddings, funerals and anniversaries 
b. Annual contributions to state officials such as school teachers and doctors day.   
c. Contributions for ancestor worship and Buddhist pagoda.  
d. Contributions to officials for support completing state procedures    
 
The level of expenditure varies from rich to very poor households but all households are 
expected to contribute to each of these schemes.  Crucially, commune officials have the 
discretionary power to impose fees, levies and contributions on villagers in attempts to 
compensate for central government revenue shortfalls. The result is a system of ad hoc 
arrangements that are not transparent and decisions about investment selection and 
contribution schemes are characterized by top-down processes. Also, because these 
arrangements are not prepared as part of the annual planning process, villagers can not plan 
expenditure for contributions. Avenues for complaint about ad hoc arrangements, such as 
the Commune People’s Council and Commune Inspectorate Board, are weak. In some 
communes the outcome has been social unrest and protest, such as in Thai Binh.  
 
For example: In one commune in Bac Lieu province, commune officials wanted to improve 
their prestige at district level. In order to mobilise finances to seal 15 kilometres of road, 
commune officials forced people to contribute regardless of their economic status. 
Commune officials did not conduct a public meeting to discuss details of the project or 
mode of payment as prescribed by law. Contributions were fixed at 59,000 VND/meter of 
road that passed through each household’s property. Accordingly, some households were to 
pay 12 million VND. Commune administrators “advised” people to mortgage or sell their 
land if they could not pay. People who did not pay or were too poor to pay were placed 
                                                 
5
 Unofficial contributions have a significant impact on the capacity of the household to contribute to official 
projects. For example, the typical Khmer household contributes 30% of the rice harvest to the Pagoda, and 
Kinh households contribute large amounts annually to ancestor worship.  
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under custody in the commune. On the 16 July 2003, commune officials reported to district 
and provincial authorities that they were the first commune in the province to complete 
their section of the road due to the joint efforts of the commune authorities and villagers6. 
(Tuoi Tre Newspaper 24.7.03) 
 
For the 2006-2010 period, central authorities have issued planning and policy documents 
that outline the increased role that official contributions raised through province resources 
and contributions from state corporations, mass organizations, the private sector and 
individual households will have in poverty reduction programmes.  However, the role of 
poor on some very important issues is still unclear. The poor need to be included in 
decisions about the level and type of contributions. For example, transparent mechanisms 
are needed that outline conditions when exemptions to contributions would apply, the rights 
and conditions of the poor when they provide labour to state construction projects, and 
preferential selection of the poor to work as paid labourers in projects and increase income.  
 
The preparation of guidelines for the next stage of the national programmes will start in 
early 2006. This provides an excellent opportunity to ensure that guidelines are developed 
that improve the pro-poor nature of contribution mechanisms. It involves finding solutions 
to some critical problems in present contribution schemes.  
 
This brief report is an initial step to assess problems and provide analysis of the 
contribution system, and outline the minimum required to ensure that the poor access 
employment opportunities in local projects with equitable working conditions, participate 
in decisions about contribution schemes, and a framework that clearly outlines conditions 
where the poor are partially or completely exempted from contributing. This involves a 
range of issues such as improving the use of participatory processes, understanding the 
vulnerability of the poor, capacity building, institutional change, political will, developing 
the regulatory framework and planning process, and better monitoring and evaluation.  
 
                                                 
6
 After this situation was made public, Bac Lieu PC directed Gia Rai district administration to organise urgent 
meetings with villagers. Bac Lieu PC also reviewed methods to solicit contributions for infrastructure and 
established regulations to ensure that the situation did not reoccur.  
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2.  Problem Analysis of local Contribution Mechanisms in NTP-PR and P135 
 
Community Participation 
A “bottom-up” planning process is often simply by-passed.  Investment decisions are often 
made based on limited criteria by a small group of key officials. The criteria used includes 
decisions based on local knowledge and personal experience, relationships with contractors, 
targets set by higher levels and results from pilot activities conducted locally. Key officials 
include leaders from the People’s Committee, the Party apparatus and a few main mass 
organizations.  The end result is short- and long-term strategic planning which does not 
effectively utilize participatory assessment tools or demand- driven approaches to develop 
contribution schemes. In this milieu there is little incentive for villagers to contribute  
 
Table 1 presents the percentage of households who accessed information about the NTP-PR 
and P135 in 2004 using Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS) conducted 
by GSO. 58.5% of poor households knew that there were poverty reduction sub-
programmes under NTP-PR and P135. Alternatively, this means that 42.3% of the poor 
households had no idea of the programmes, and so did not contribute ideas to the planning 
and implementation process. Also, informed households also may not participate in the 
village meetings. The percentage of households who had knowledge about the 
infrastructure projects under NTP-PR and P135 was even lower, at 25.5%. The main source 
for households to access knowledge was village meetings with 84.8% of informed 
households receiving information in this way. Other households accessed knowledge from 
media such as television, newspapers, and etc.  
 
It is interesting that the percentage of households informed about the NTP-PR and P135 
was higher in ethnic minorities. 71.6% of ethnic households had knowledge about the 
poverty reduction sub-programmes under NTP-PR and P135, and 45.3% had been informed 
about infrastructure projects in these programmes. The percentage of informed households 
is also higher in the mountainous regions where most poverty reduction sub-programmes 








Percentage of households who know about the 
following programs  
NTP-PR/P135 NTP-PR/P135 NTP-PR/P135 
Poverty status    
Non-poor 57.2 25.0 67.2 
Poor 58.7 27.9 84.8 
Total 57.5 25.5 70.2 
By ethnicities    
Kinh/Chinese 55.8 23.3 67.6 
Ethnic minorities 71.6 45.3 87.6 
Total 57.5 25.5 70.2 
Note: NTP-PR is the national targeted programs on poverty reduction 
(conducted by MOLISA)  




Table 2: Percentage of households in P135 communes who have any information on the 
NTP-PR and P 135 (in 2004) 
Household sub-
groups 
Percentage of households who know about the 
following programs  
NTP-PR/P135 NTP-PR/P135 NTP-PR/P135 
Poverty status    
Non-poor 65.7 43.0 79.7 
Poor 68.4 44.1 89.8 
Total 66.8 43.5 83.9 
By ethnicities    
Kinh/Chinese 57.4 34.4 75.3 
Ethnic minorities 76.7 53.1 90.8 
Total 66.8 43.5 83.9 
Note: NTP-PR is the national targeted programs on poverty reduction 
(implemented by MOLISA). 
(2) Estimates for the rural areas.   
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 2004 
 
Table 2 estimates the percentage of households informed about NTP-PR and P135 by 
households in P135 communes. Even in P135 areas, however, there were only 66.8% of 
households who knew the existence of the NTP-PR and P135. In poor and ethnic minority 
households this figure was 68.4% and 76.7%.  
 
The fact that poor households often had knowledge about the programme via village 
meetings was a key finding in a qualitative survey conducted by the consultant team in 4 
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communes in 2 districts in Hoa Binh province7 (Table 3). About 80% of the poor 
households interviewed participated in village meetings to discuss P 135 activities.  
 
Table 3: Poor households attending village meetings in a Hoa Binh and Bac Ninh province 
survey 
District Poor households attending village meetings 
No Yes Total 
Luong Son (Hoa Binh)    
           In number 5 23 28 
           In percent    17.9 82.1 100 
Thuan Thanh (Bac Ninh)    
           In number 7 29 36 
           In percent    19.4 80.6 100 
Total    
           In number 12 52 64 
           In percent    18.8 81.2 100 
 
Households do not have information on issues such as technology, financial mechanisms 
and management models that are needed for better and informed choices during village and 
commune planning meetings.  The roles and responsibilities of each agency involved in the 
information transfer process are not clear.   
 
There are no explicit mechanisms in any laws to encourage women’s participation 
including the Grassroots Democracy Decree. In any case, even when women attend 
meetings they often do not speak for cultural reasons, and local officials do not perceive a 
need to involve them in decision making, beyond formal consultation of the Women’s 
Union.  
 
Models of good practice on community participation that are available, in particular from 
donor-assisted and INGO projects, have not been mainstreamed in provinces. This is a lost 
opportunity. 
                                                 
7
 The survey was conducted by the consultants in November 2005 in two P135 communes of Luong Son 
district, Hoa Binh province and two “difficult” communes of Thuan Thanh district, Bac Ninh province. 
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Vulnerability of the Poor 
Household contributions to official commune projects are assessed on a per capita basis and 
more remote areas pay more for access. The poor are adversely affected by this system 
because they often have larger families and live in remote and isolated areas in the 
commune. The poor have less opportunity to access off-farm employment because of issues 
such as low human capital, low asset base or lack of capacity to migrate to other areas. The 
result is that they are more dependent on low-paid agricultural employment and income 
from paid labour in local investment projects. These sources of income are seasonal or 
unreliable, which impacts on their well-being. The poor often lack vital information about 
legal benefits and work conditions because they live in remote and isolated areas. In 
communes with high poverty rates, the poor seldom participate in decisions about 
contribution modalities and labour conditions for local infrastructure construction. The lack 
of transparency and information flow often results in officials entering into corrupt 
arrangements with contractors, such as the hiring of skilled labour from outside or paying 
lower daily rates than prescribed by the Labour Law.  
 
Local poor people may also not know the going rate for labour per day, making them 
vulnerable to manipulation by contractors. This is in part because ethnic peoples who are 
living in a basically subsistence economy often have difficulty valuing their own labour (in 
one commune they said they base it on the price they get for pigs). 
 
The development of pro-poor local contribution schemes must be combined with grassroots 
democracy, decentralized budgets, and restructure of local revenue raising and involve a 
system of proportional exemptions/grants and employment generation. Schemes must cause 
the least disruption possible to poor people’s other survival strategies, which involves being 
sensitive to issues such as the timing and sequencing of inputs.  
 
Capacity of Officials  
Research indicated that principles such as grassroots democracy, transparency and 
accountability, were not well understood by both officials and the community. This had a 
significant impact on the provision of services. For example, targeting of the healthcare 
card was random and many poor households, such as households in remote areas, missed 
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out. The poor did not participate in the selection process to decide who received a 
healthcare exemption card, and people with the cards did not clearly understand their 
entitlements. The research identified that inadequate targeting was a major factor in the 
inefficient distribution of social assistance during times of crisis. The fact that only 1% of 
programme budgets was allocated to capacity building reflects both the low level of 
importance placed on capacity building by programme planner and implementers despite 
the rhetoric and helps explain the continuing problem of low capacity at local levels.   
 
Decentralisation is being implemented but the different roles of officials and villagers and 
how they should interact in this changing environment is not clear. The result is slow 
change. In addition, the majority of the poor were unaware of policies such as “One-Stop 
Shop”, and were not confident in interacting with local politicians.  
 
On investment projects, officials disseminate information and conduct very limited 
monitoring and enforcement of the Labour Law and labour standards and there is little 
incentive for contractors to be sensitive to the capabilities of local labour. The result is that 
in most cases the conditions outlined in the Law are not followed. For example, many state 
projects stipulate at least 5% local input in the project document. This is usually provided 
as labour. Yet, most projects do not reach this level with many only utilizing about 1% of 
local input. Contractors prefer to hire in their own labour, which is better skilled and easier 
to manage.  They consider local labour lazy or too difficult to train. In addition, if the 
labour is unpaid, it is often difficult for the commune or contractor to mobilize local people. 
In Dac Lac it was mentioned that road construction work normally takes place at the same 
time as the coffee harvest – coffee picking is an easier and better paid job than 
infrastructure works, so even for paid labour it is very difficult to recruit local labourers. 
 
In the multi-sector market economy, stakeholders have different, sometimes conflicting, 
interests (public vs. private). Many provincial leaders, department heads, and district and 
commune officials do not have the experience in dealing with how to resolve these 
competing interests efficiently, and achieve economic and social goals in the most effective 
way. This environment is new for officials, and very different from centralized planning.  
The role of the private sector is still unclear, and relations between officials and contractors 
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are often not transparent and characterized by shady deals involving local labour 
contributions. This limits the development of the private sector and inhibits a competitive 
process.  
 
In communes where a participatory planning process has been conducted, often it has not 
been matched with decisions over budget allocation. Commune and district officials do not 
utilize the list of priorities identified by the community during consultations. Until local 
levels can raise and spend funds autonomously, local planning processes will remain 
inefficient and continue to depend on central government grants.  
 
Officials are not experienced in developing the private sector using tools such as social 
marketing and market chain analysis. In this environment, planning for the scaling up of 
small-scale business activities is difficult. The policy of “Socialisation” is not well 
understood in the provinces. Officials perceive the main focus of the policy as increasing 
the contributions of villagers and do not see the broader picture which includes more 
villager participation in decisions and the role of the private sector.  
 
Institutional Issues  
Villagers have no recourse once decisions concerning contributions are made. The 
commune People’s Council is the advocate of the community but it seldom meets and key 
officials in the Council are usually part of the People’s Committee or Party apparatus, 
which could influence their perspectives. The People’s Inspectorate Board also has 
responsibility to monitor social conditions in the commune but this institution is very weak 
and unable to implement its mandate. Inevitably, the poor pay a price for this. They are 
expected to contribute to investments and if levels are set too high they have no avenue to 
respond.  Women headed households face a particular dilemma; they are often both labour 
and income scarce.   
 
Central and provincial allocations are recorded and controlled by the Treasury system and 
so leakage of funds is limited by exerted control over disbursement and acquittal. However, 
contributions by households (whether in cash or in kind) and donor agencies are not 
recorded at district and provincial level. This means that there is a large amount of money 
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in the system which can not be accounted, which increases the potential for leakage.  In 
addition, it is not clear what contributions are used for. For example, households pay 
irrigation fees for service and maintenance, but considering the degraded state of most 
irrigation schemes, it is obvious that O&M is a low financial priority. Villagers are not 
confident that their financial contributions are used for the intended purpose and so are 
reluctant to contribute.  
 
Political Will  
The political will and capacity of key commune officials is a significant factor affecting the 
contribution system. Commune officials have discretionary power to decide how to use 
local contributions, and proper monitoring, transparency and accountability systems are 
lacking. The result is officials arbitrary impose new taxes, fees and levies to resolve budget 
shortfalls. Some villagers reported that they paid into 20 formal contribution schemes each 
year.8 Villagers have no effective way to complain about the level and purpose of these 
contributions, and the situation sometimes ends up in the exploitation of the community, 
especially the poor.  
 
Officials are dependent on guidance from higher levels.  Leaders do not develop actions or 
activities in response to their strategic plan but wait until the level of financial contribution 
from higher level is made clear. With this information officials design actions and 
activities. It would be more effective if leaders were proactive and took the initiative to 
develop the full range of activities needed to carry out their strategic plan.  
 
There is an urgent need to develop district and commune leaders’ commitment to 
innovative ways to increase local revenue, search for their own solutions and function as 
more independent units within an integrated administrative hierarchy. Presently, there is a 
passive reliance by leaders on subsidies and targets set by higher levels. Decentralization 
has increased the responsibilities of local leaders in the planning process. However, they 
lack commitment to carry out these responsibilities, develop a comprehensive set of actions 
and activities including a comprehensive contribution system, and then find funding from a 
                                                 
8
 Discussion with villagers in Hai Lang District, Quang Tri Province, October 2004. 
  12
range of local sources, the private sector in particular. Leaders do not use available data and 
information effectively for analysis and goal setting.  
 
Research identified two issues: political commitment needs to be linked with human 
capacity, and political commitment is essential for change but just as important is the 
political commitment to enforce the institutionalisation of new practices and procedures.  
 
Regulatory Framework  
Much of the construction of infrastructure in communes relies on locally provided labour, 
financial or in-kind contributions. The poor do not have the funds for financial 
contributions to investments so often provide labour. The GoV has a comprehensive policy 
and legal framework outlining national standards for types of labour. This involves 
standards for recruitment and labour conditions such as workers compensation, 
remuneration levels, recruitment modalities etc. The Grassroots Democracy Decree 
provides the legal means where villagers participate in decisions about level of 
contributions by whom and priorities in development. The national policy of Socialisation 
promotes the mobilization of resources from the public and private sectors to resolve local 
development goals.  
 
In practice, the implementation of these laws and policies is not consistent across 
communes. In most communes, formal contribution schemes are based more on traditional 
modalities. Decisions on the level of contributions and ways of contributing are often made 
by a few key village and commune leaders. For infrastructure projects, implementation 
plans, selection of contractors and targets are often set by the district, or even the province. 
 
Commune leaders often comment that the implementation of Grassroots Democracy is 
reflected in the amount of contributions made by households. A high rate of contributions 
indicates approval for the project and the contribution scheme. Meetings to discuss the 
construction of infrastructure often concentrate on the level of contributions by households 
and do not consider how disadvantaged groups such as the poor can be provided access or 
participate in decisions. Access to clean water and sanitation is a good example. 
Households who can contribute receive access.  Using a participatory planning process to 
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help make decisions about contribution schemes is not considered a high priority by 
commune and village leaders.  
 
There is a lack of consistent and simple regulations and technical guidelines of small-scale 
infrastructure issued by provincial government. The result is official campaigns to mobilize 
resources from mass organizations and households, such as socialization, have had very 
limited impact.   
 
Responsibilities and duties of officials have not been revised in line with the process of 
decentralization. If responsibilities are not regularly revised and clarified in this changing 
milieu, then further progress in the decentralization process will be affected. Outcomes 
from decentralisation need to focus on both developing institutional arrangements between 
line agencies, levels within each line agency and also ensure reforms are implemented 
consistently at local levels. 
 
Strategic Planning  
Contributions schemes are initiated on a needs basis responding to immediate problems and 
not developed according to a strategic plan prepared by the commune. Villagers can not 
prepare in advance for contribution schemes and there is often confusion in the communes 
on what contributions are voluntary, what contributions are considered to be national 
service and what contributions should be paid an allowance. Commune leaders do not 
provide information on the different schemes or entitlements when labour is provided. 
While regulations require at least 5% of local labour contributions in projects, this is not 
effectively carried out. Usually, local contributions are much lower. Very little monitoring 
of the labour situation in communes and villages is conducted by district level. The poor are 
not aware of schemes that entitle them to preferential access to paid labour in poverty 
reduction projects to increase their income. The reliance on ad hoc arrangements in the 
communes results in village reluctance to provide their labour.  Incentives and benefits 
need to be made explicit.  
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Budgetary Issues  
The Grassroots Democracy Decree outlines that local level of contributions and commune 
budgeting are to be discussed in village meetings using participatory budgeting processes. 
Research identified that these legal requirements are not applied consistently in the 
communes. In some communes, villagers decided the level and type of contributions but 
were not consulted about selecting investments. In other communes, level and type of 
contributions was not discussed and decisions were made by representatives of the 
community at commune level. Targets and level of contributions were issued by district 
level. In all communes, issues involving the special conditions for the poor were not 
discussed, such as exemptions and employment preferences.  However, some villagers 
commented that the poor were often consulted to work in areas that no-one else wanted, for 
example, extremely dusty or mountainous or very wet.   
 
The participatory budgeting schemes introduced under P135 are limited to discussing 
budgets for local infrastructure. Allocated funds can not be used for other purposes which 
would benefit the community, such as developing information flows, O&M and production 
inputs, which brings into question how participatory the budgetary process really is.   
 
Monitoring and Evaluation  
One of the key activities outlined in the Grassroots Democracy Decree is the participatory 
monitoring and supervision of work done by government. However mechanisms for this 
monitoring and supervision are not well defined in the legislation and are the weakest parts 
in the implementation of the decree. In particular, in the communes there is confusion over 
the precise mechanisms for supervision.  
 
Effective targeting, and the development of strategic and implementation plans with 
effective labour contribution schemes is reliant on high-quality and up-to-date information. 
However, the data and information necessary to understand the multi-dimensional nature of 
labour contributions and pro-poor economic growth potential is generally poor and is not 
enriched by the use of all available sources of information. There is no monitoring of labour 
contributions or the implementation of the Labour Law, and so key officials are not 
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provided information for reporting and planning.  Effective participatory planning 
techniques are not used and the use of extensive stakeholder consultations, or the 
undertaking of research and assessment is not common.  
 
Provinces do not make enough use of the Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey and 
do not appear to recognize opportunities open to them to make more use of the survey in 
the future as it becomes more applicable to provincial analysis.  
 
There are sources of data and information available in the provinces but they are not 
utilized. Reasons include problems with the reliability of the data, inexperience in 
managing and using the data, and very limited storage of data and information.  
 
At the commune, there are two main surveys: the poverty assessment conducted by 
DOLISA and the land survey. Key issues have been identified:  
• There is no specific data collected for labour contributions 
• The poverty assessment is income based and does not collect information about 
cross-cutting issues, such as the impact of labour contributions  
• Assessments concentrates on technical aspects of investments with limited focus 
on social aspects  
• Officials organize the surveys and send the data and information to higher levels 
without using it for local short- and long-term planning.  
• Data and information is not stored in the commune, which limits strategy 
development and implementation planning.  
• The DOLISA survey is very complicated and time consuming which limits 
resources available for monitoring of the Labour Law.  
 
3.   Analysis of existing guidelines on local contributions  
 
The Vietnamese Labour Code of 2002 provides the regulatory framework for the labour 
standards, labour utilization and the obligations of workers and employers. The Labour 
Code applies to urban and rural labourers who have signed a labour contract or have a 
verbal agreement. However, the Code does not apply to all of the labour market, for 
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example, labourers below the age of 15 and labourers who have not signed a contract or 
have a verbal agreement, including most of the self-employed. These labourers are more 
often than not poor.  
 
The broad principles embodied in Socialisation are the basis of contribution schemes in the 
national programmes. Socialisation involves the mobilisation of resources from all 
stakeholders in the pubic and private sectors to resolve development priorities. These 
priorities are decided through demand driven processes utilising Grassroots Democracy. 
Once priorities are decided, implementation depends on the participation and contributions 
from all sectors in the community including individuals, households, corporate bodies and 
the private sector. With increased local investment, contributions from the state budget are 
minimised. The focus of ‘socialisation’ is to increase local ownership and management of 
investments for the long-term. 
 
Cooperatives under the 1997 Cooperative Law and Cooperative Groups under the Civil 
Law Code are popular in different parts of the country and have a central role in national 
policy to develop employment opportunities in communes. However, they have limitations. 
Cooperatives are formal institutions approved by the district and require experienced 
financial management. Cooperative groups can not borrow money collectively and only 
borrow money through individual members, which often excludes the poor.  
 
Decree 24/1999/ND-CP was issued in April 1999 and regulates the mobilisation, 
management and utilisation of people’s contribution to construct rural infrastructure in 
communes and district towns. The Decree outlines the central role and responsibilities of 
the commune PC, including the mobilisation and utilisation of user contributions based on 
the approval of the commune People’s Council. After project approval for construction, the 
commune PC prepares a plan for the management and utilisation of funds for the 
infrastructure and establishes a board to supervise implementation and financial 
arrangements.  
 
In 2003 Decree 07/2003/ND-CP on the management of investment and construction was 
issued. The objective of Decree 07 is to improve the decentralization of investment 
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management and construction. Provincial PC can authorize the district PC to appraise and 
decide investments less than VND 3 billion. The district can authorize commune PC to 
decide and control the implementation of projects less than VND 1 billion. However, in 
practice, most rural infrastructure is small-scale and decided by district level and the steps 
for investment preparation are very time-consuming and costly.  
 
The CPC meets with the project supervisory board (which often includes commune 
officials), cooperative, village leaders with representatives of beneficiaries to discuss level, 
types and timing of contributions. Contributions of labour have a priority over material 
contributions, though contributions of land are sometimes also required. Contributions are 
received in cash only when there are needs for procurement on materials and equipment 
that beneficiaries can not produce themselves. The project supervision board assigns one 
member (usually the commune accountant) to monitor the contribution scheme and keep 
notes on revenues and expenditures. Contributions in cash are often paid directly to the 
contractor in accordance with the contract between the CPC and the contractor.   
 
Joint Decision 666 issued by MPI, CEM, MoF and MoC on the 23rd August 2001, is the 
main instrument outlining contribution modalities for Programme 135. The PPC has the 
responsibility to organise the mobilization of local resources such as material and labour 
from each level of government, mass organizations and the community including 
disadvantaged groups. The district PC has the responsibility to decide and appoint 
contractors for construction projects under 135 and must ensure that contractors give 
preference to using local labour in communes and pay the salary of these workers according 
to an agreed amount as fixed in the contract. Commune officials have the responsibility to 
monitor the implementation of the conditions of the labour agreement. Feasibility studies 
must outline clearly the volume of materials, funds, the level of local labour assigned to the 
commune.   
 
There are two main criteria for selecting 135 investments: to serve the community, and 
create employment and increase the income of villagers by working in projects. 
Investments should be selected using democratic processes and the commune People’s 
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Council decides the type, scale and priority of investments, and the ability of the commune 
to mobilize resources for construction.  
 
In June 2002, MoLISA, MoF, MPI, issued Joint Decision 6 that outlines policy guidelines 
to implement the state fund for employment generation and in poverty reduction 
programmes. The key component of the guidelines is the provision of credit to develop 
employment opportunities in communes. Special conditions are provided to borrowers who 
provide employment for the poor.  
 
Presently, there are a range of mechanisms for implementing labour contributions, and all 
have inherent problems. Many of the poor are not covered by the Labour Law which 
creates the conditions for the misuse of their labour or exploitation. Commune officials do 
not have the capacity to conduct effective targeting of the poor or develop tools to respond 
to the causes of this poverty. They either lack the incentive to monitor the implementation 
of the law or and there is more incentive to develop financial relations with contractors. 
There is a lack of monitoring by district on the development of commune/contractor 
relations. Socialisation has aspects that could promote a more equitable, flexible and 
inclusive contribution system. However, there are no guidelines for implementation, and in 
the provinces the policy is vague and not well understood. NP 135 and NTP-PR have 
developed guidelines for the implementation of their respective programmes but they lack 
guidelines that outline contribution schemes, in particular labour conditions, workers’ 
compensation, selection processes and level of contributions.   Training handbooks also 
lack reference to these important aspects of the programmes. Policies to improve access to 
employment opportunities for the poor are known by commune officials but methods to 
implement the programme are not available. The poor are not aware of this programme.   
 
4.   Analysis of contribution mechanisms in P135 and NTP HEPR  
 
4.1. People’s contribution to public activities  
 
As mentioned above, people are required to contribute work days or cash to public 
activities such as the construction of infrastructure and social welfare funds. It is expected 
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that the contribution mechanism is more favourable for the poor and ethnic minorities. 
However evidence from the VHLSS indicates that the system has problems and is not 
significantly pro-poor or pro-ethnic minorities9.  
 
Table 4 shows the percentage of people who are 15 years old and above, and contribute 
work days in years 1998 and 2002 by expenditure quintiles and rural/urban areas. The 
percentage of those who contributed to public work is higher among the poor, especially 
the poor in rural areas. For example, in 1998, 28% of the poor in rural areas had to work for 
public activities10, while this figure for the richest was 8.8% and 2.1% in rural and urban 
areas, respectively. In terms of contribution by days, it is clear that the current contribution 
is pro-rich.  
 
The percentage of people contributing work days reduced from 1998-2002 for the people in 
rural areas, but it increased for the people in urban areas. However, Table 5 indicates that 
the average number of days for contributing people increased by around 2 days from 5.5 to 
7.6 days during this period.  
 
Table 4: Percentage of people whose age are from 15 and above and have contributed 




Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total 
Poorest 28.1 0.9 27.2 23.5 12.1 23.0 
Near Poorest 21.4 5.2 20.4 16.0 10.0 15.5 
Middle 15.4 3.2 14.0 13.6 8.7 13.0 
Near Richest 12.9 4.8 10.7 10.4 5.9 9.2 
Richest 8.8 2.1 4.4 6.9 5.0 5.7 
Total 18.3 3.0 14.4 14.9 6.1 12.7 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 1998-2002 
 
Table 5 also indicates that there is not a significant gap between the average number of 







                                                 
9
 Note that in some Tables, there are no estimates for the year 2004 because information was not collected.  
10
 VHLSS does not collect information on the kinds of public activities.   
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Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total 
Poorest 5.1 1.0 5.1 7.6 6.8 7.6 
Near Poorest 5.5 6.5 5.5 7.8 7.4 7.8 
Middle 6.2 5.1 6.2 7.4 8.2 7.5 
Near Richest 6.0 4.4 5.8 7.5 8.2 7.6 
Richest 5.4 5.3 5.3 6.9 8.6 7.8 
Total 5.6 5.0 5.5 7.6 8.2 7.6 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 1998-2002 
 
Tables 6 through 9 estimate the percentage of contributing people and the average 
contribution days by regions, poverty status and ethnicity. It indicates that the poor in 
northern mountainous regions, for example the North West and North East, have the 
highest percentage of people who contributed work days to public activities. Non-poor 
people in rich regions, such as the North East South, have the lowest contribution ratios by 
work days. It is expected that rich people tend to contribute to public activities in cash 
rather than work days. However, people including the poor and non-poor in the Mekong 
Delta and Red River Delta have the highest number of contribution days on average.   
 
Table 6: Percentage of people aged from 15 and above and contributed public work days by 
regions and poverty status 
Regions 1998 2002 
Non-poor Poor Total Non-poor Poor Total 
1. Red River Delta 10.8 23.8 14.4 6.2 12.0 7.3 
2. North East 23.7 37.0 30.5 27.1 37.1 30.5 
3. North West 33.3 39.2 37.0 21.5 45.6 37.2 
4. North Central Coast 27.0 37.6 31.5 18.0 26.1 21.2 
5. South Central Coast 3.8 3.2 3.6 6.1 10.9 7.2 
6. Central Highlands 13.2 28.0 19.4 18.7 27.2 22.7 
7. North East South 2.7 9.5 3.3 7.2 5.8 7.1 
8. Mekong River Delta 5.1 6.3 5.4 4.4 6.1 4.7 
All Vietnam 10.2 24.1 14.4 9.9 21.0 12.7 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 1998-2002 
 
Compared with the Kinh and Chinese people, ethnic minorities have a higher percentage of 
people who worked in public activities at 28.6% and 29.4% in 1998 and 2002, respectively. 
However the average number of days that each person contributed was similar between the 





Table 7: Average work days contributed by regions and poverty status 
Regions 1998 2002 
Non-poor Poor Total Non-poor Poor Total 
1. Red River Delta 5.7 5.0 5.4 8.9 9.4 9.1 
2. North East 5.8 6.1 6.0 8.6 8.2 8.5 
3. North West 4.0 4.8 4.5 7.7 8.9 8.7 
4. North Central Coast 5.5 4.5 5.0 6.5 6.7 6.6 
5. South Central Coast 4.3 3.9 4.2 6.7 6.3 6.6 
6. Central Highlands 4.1 4.6 4.4 6.4 4.8 5.5 
7. North East South 5.4 3.3 4.8 6.3 5.3 6.3 
8. Mekong River Delta 9.1 7.7 8.7 8.5 9.1 8.7 
All Vietnam 5.9 5.2 5.5 7.7 7.6 7.6 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 1998-2002 
 
 
Table 8: Percentage of people aged from 15 and above and contributed public work days by 
regions and ethnicity 










1. Red River Delta 14.3 16.6 14.4 7.3 12.8 7.3 
2. North East 23.1 38.6 30.5 29.1 33.1 30.5 
3. North West 19.6 44.4 37.0 18.9 42.3 37.2 
4. North Central Coast 31.3 37.0 31.5 19.9 37.0 21.2 
5. South Central Coast 4.1 0.0 3.6 6.9 13.3 7.2 
6. Central Highlands 11.1 29.9 19.4 19.5 28.6 22.7 
7. North East South 2.8 17.1 3.3 7.1 7.1 7.1 
8. Mekong River Delta 5.7 3.0 5.4 4.5 7.8 4.7 
All Vietnam 12.4 28.6 14.4 10.6 29.4 12.7 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 1998-2002 
 
Table 9: Average work days contributed by region and ethnicity 










1. Red River Delta 5.3 9.1 5.4 9.0 9.4 9.1 
2. North East 5.6 6.2 6.0 9.1 7.5 8.5 
3. North West 3.8 4.6 4.5 6.1 9.0 8.7 
4. North Central Coast 5.0 5.0 5.0 6.5 7.3 6.6 
5. South Central Coast 4.2 0.0 4.2 6.8 4.2 6.6 
6. Central Highlands 4.3 4.4 4.4 5.6 5.5 5.5 
7. North East South 5.3 2.5 4.8 6.3 5.9 6.3 
8. Mekong River Delta 8.9 4.8 8.7 8.6 9.1 8.7 
All Vietnam 5.5 5.6 5.5 7.7 7.5 7.6 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 1998-2002 
 
The gender issue in labour contributions is analyzed in Tables 10, 11 and 12. In general, the 
contribution by the male population was higher than the female population. For example, in 
2002, males aged from 15 and above contributed 15.6%, while this figure was 10% for 
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females (Table 10).  Table 11 presents the percentages by gender among contributing 
people. It shows that 57.5% of contributing people were male in 1998, and this percentage 
rate increased slightly to 59.6% in 2002. It is interesting from Table 12 that in 1998 the 
ratio of the female population was higher than the ratio of males for some regions such as 
Red River Delta and South Central Coast, but in 2002 the ratio of males contributing was 
higher than the ratio of females for all regions.  
 
However, in terms of the average number of days contributed, there is rather equality 
between the female and male population for all regions in 2002.  
 
Table 10: Percentage of people aged from 15 and above and contributed public work days 
by regions and gender 
Regions 1998 2002 
Male Female Total Male Female Total 
1. Red River Delta 15.0 13.8 14.4 8.7 6.1 7.3 
2. North East 36.2 25.2 30.5 37.5 24.0 30.5 
3. North West 41.7 32.3 37.0 41.5 32.8 37.2 
4. North Central Coast 36.4 27.4 31.5 22.2 20.3 21.2 
5. South Central Coast 3.7 3.6 3.6 9.1 5.3 7.2 
6. Central Highlands 27.2 12.1 19.4 26.6 18.8 22.7 
7. North East South 6.2 0.7 3.3 9.7 4.7 7.1 
8. Mekong River Delta 9.7 1.7 5.4 8.2 1.5 4.7 
All Vietnam 17.6 11.6 14.4 15.6 10.0 12.7 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 1998-2002 
 
Table 11: Percentage of male and females aged from 15 and above and contributed public 
work days by regions 
Regions 1998 2002 
Male Female Total Male Female Total 
1. Red River Delta 48.6 51.4 100 57.0 43.0 100 
2. North East 57.5 42.5 100 59.4 40.6 100 
3. North West 55.6 44.4 100 56.2 43.8 100 
4. North Central Coast 52.8 47.2 100 50.9 49.1 100 
5. South Central Coast 48.6 51.5 100 61.7 38.3 100 
6. Central Highlands 68.1 31.9 100 58.5 41.5 100 
7. North East South 89.5 10.5 100 65.9 34.1 100 
8. Mekong River Delta 83.2 16.8 100 83.4 16.6 100 
All Vietnam 57.5 42.5 100 59.6 40.5 100 







Table 12: Average work days contributed by region and gender 
 
Regions 1998 2002 
Male Female Total Male Female Total 
1. Red River Delta 5.8 5.0 5.4 9.1 9.0 9.1 
2. North East 5.9 6.1 6.0 8.5 8.3 8.5 
3. North West 4.9 3.9 4.5 8.7 8.7 8.7 
4. North Central Coast 5.5 4.4 5.0 6.6 6.6 6.6 
5. South Central Coast 3.8 4.6 4.2 6.5 6.7 6.6 
6. Central Highlands 4.8 3.5 4.4 5.2 5.9 5.5 
7. North East South 5.0 3.8 4.8 6.3 6.3 6.3 
8. Mekong River Delta 8.9 7.5 8.7 8.8 8.3 8.7 
All Vietnam 5.9 5.0 5.5 7.7 7.6 7.6 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 1998-2002 
 
Tables 13 to 18 present household contributions in cash to public work and social funds for 
activities such as poverty reduction and education encouragement, and calamity mitigation, 
etc. over the period 1998 – 2002 – 2004. Table 13 indicates that the percentage of 
households who contributed in cash to public activities increased over time.  This rate was 
71.5% in 1998 and increased to 85.2% in 2002. As expected the percentage of households 
who contributed in cash to public activities was higher for the rich than for the poor. In 
2004, 94% of the richest households and 71.6% of the poorest contributed in cash.       
 
Table 13: Percentage of households who contributed in cash to public work and social 
funds by expenditure quintiles and rural/urban 
Expenditure 
quintiles 
 1998   2002   2004  
Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total 
Poorest 65.3 48.5 64.8 71.1 52.4 70.3 72.8 52.1 71.6 
Near Poorest 75.2 37.0 73.0 77.3 70.7 76.8 83.2 72.8 82.2 
Middle 73.9 56.4 72.0 80.0 78.7 79.9 86.7 85.4 86.5 
Near Richest 75.4 63.3 72.3 81.1 86.2 82.4 87.7 90.2 88.4 
Richest 77.1 72.6 74.2 83.0 92.4 88.9 89.1 96.4 94.0 
Total 73.0 66.9 71.5 78.0 87.2 80.2 83.2 90.7 85.2 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 1998-2002-2004 
 
In terms of the absolute value of contributions, the rich also contributed higher than the 
poor with the gap increasing over time. In 2004, the amount contributed by the richest was 
almost twice as much as the amount contributed by the poorest. However if we look at the 
expenditure per capita for households by expenditure quintiles presented in Table 23 in the 
Appendix, this contribution was not pro-poor, since the richest had more than 6 times the 
expenditure per capita as the poorest in the year 2004.     
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 1998   2002   2004  
Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total 
Poorest 61.3 28.5 60.6 74.9 67.9 74.6 89.4 77.8 88.9 
Near 
Poorest 74.0 43.1 73.1 83.2 74.2 82.6 104.2 106.8 104.4 
Middle 75.3 33.3 71.7 89.5 83.9 88.8 106.9 117.2 108.4 
Near 
Richest 73.5 53.7 69.2 91.1 88.4 90.4 116.7 133.4 121.5 
Richest 82.3 87.9 85.8 104.3 131.6 122.1 144.1 176.0 166.1 
Total 72.7 74.4 73.1 87.3 113.9 94.3 108.9 154.8 121.8 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 1998-2002-2004 
 
Alternatively, when we estimate the contribution as a percentage of total expenditure, this 
figure is higher for the poor than for the rich over 1998-2004 (Table 15).    
 
Table 15: Average percentage of cash contribution over total household expenditures by 




 1998   2002   2004  
Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total 
Poorest 1.0 0.4 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 
Near Poorest 0.9 0.4 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 
Middle 0.8 0.3 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7 
Near Richest 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Richest 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 
Total 0.8 0.3 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.7 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 1998-2002-2004 
 
Tables 16 to 18 present the percentage of households who contributed in cash by regions 
and ethnicity, which was rather high in the mountainous regions of North East and North 
West and the North Central Coast during 2002 – 2004 compared with other regions. These 
regions are the poorest and have extreme difficulties in development. They also had a rather 
high absolute value of cash contributions. For example, in the North East and North West 
the average contribution was around VND 95 thousand, while the average contribution in 
the Red River Delta and North East South was VND 101 thousand and 167 thousand, 
respectively. As a result, the percentage of contribution over the total expenditure is higher 
in poor regions than for the richer regions.  
 
Ethnic minority households have lower percentages of contributing households and smaller 
amounts of average contribution, but slightly higher percentage of contribution over the 
total household expenditure.   
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Table 16: Percentage of households who contribute in cash to public work and social funds 
by regions and ethnicity 
Regions 

















1. Red River Delta 71.0 75.2 71.1 90.9 92.6 90.9 92.0 94.7 92.0 
2. North East 66.1 72.0 68.8 93.3 83.6 89.9 96.1 85.8 92.4 
3. North West 91.9 93.6 93.1 92.2 85.3 87.1 97.1 90.1 91.8 
4. North Central Coast 76.9 79.3 77.0 91.9 89.1 91.7 92.6 91.5 92.5 
5. South Central Coast 81.1 0.9 71.5 84.5 14.9 81.7 88.8 24.8 85.8 
6. Central Highlands 84.5 78.2 81.9 83.8 49.7 72.3 87.4 62.3 81.1 
7. North East South 81.1 6.9 79.2 80.3 49.7 79.5 87.3 50.7 86.1 
8. Mekong River Delta 61.9 40.5 60.0 57.4 30.9 55.8 68.3 41.2 67.0 
All Vietnam 72.6 64.0 71.5 81.5 69.1 80.2 86.2 76.6 85.2 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 1998-2002-2004 
 
Table 17: Average amount of contribution cash per household by regions and ethnicity - 
VND 
Regions 

















1. Red River Delta 92.3 49.9 91.3 85.0 79.0 85.0 100.9 93.9 100.8 
2. North East 49.4 43.4 46.6 78.4 60.5 72.7 99.0 88.4 95.5 
3. North West 38.7 29.7 32.6 76.4 64.1 67.5 108.9 91.2 95.8 
4. North Central Coast 61.7 49.7 61.3 100.0 90.2 99.4 137.9 115.5 136.0 
5. South Central Coast 79.6 120.0 79.6 88.0 48.0 87.7 109.3 42.7 108.4 
6. Central Highlands 57.1 25.7 44.6 78.8 54.8 73.3 115.2 65.2 105.5 
7. North East South 82.6 121.3 82.7 131.4 73.1 130.5 169.9 95.1 168.5 
8. Mekong River Delta 76.1 41.8 74.1 103.3 172.4 105.7 134.9 128.9 134.7 
All Vietnam 77.3 39.1 73.1 96.6 70.6 94.3 124.8 92.3 121.8 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 1998-2002-2004 
 
Table 18: Average percentage of cash contribution over total household expenditures by 
regions and ethnicity 
Regions 

















1. Red River Delta 1.1 1.0 1.1 0.7 1.0 0.7 0.6 1.1 0.6 
2. North East 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.7 
3. North West 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.7 1.0 0.9 
4. North Central Coast 0.8 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.1 
5. South Central Coast 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.7 
6. Central Highlands 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.7 
7. North East South 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 
8. Mekong River Delta 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.7 1.9 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
All Vietnam 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.7 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 1998-2002-2004 
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VHLSS did not collect information on whether local people were paid for the work that 
they contributed to public projects. However, results from a survey conducted by the 
consultants indicated that that few households were paid for work in infrastructure 
construction projects (Table 19).  
 
Table 19: Poor households paid for work in infrastructure construction in Hoa Binh and 
Bac Ninh11 
 
District Paid labor contribution of the interviewed poor households 
 No Yes Total 
Luong Son (Hoa Binh)    
         In number 20 9 29 
         In percent  69.9 31.1 100 
Thuan Thanh (Bac Ninh)    
         In number 36 0 36 
         In percent  100 0 100 
Total    
         In number 56 9 65 




4.2. Support of the NTP-PR and P135 to people contribution 
 
Although the VHLSS did not collect information on household contributions to sub-
programmes and projects in NTP-PR and P135, it does have some information on whether 
a household receives reduction or exemption for agricultural land use tax, education fee, or 
provision of free healthcare insurance cards from NTP-PR and P135.      
 
Table 20 presents the percentage of crop-growing households who were exempt from 
agricultural land use tax in 2002 for 8 regions. More specifically, the second column gives 
the estimate of the percentage of crop-growing households who were exempted from the 
land use tax over the total of poor households. The third column presents a similar figure 
but the denominator is the total of crop-growing and food poor households (estimates in the 
second and third columns are the coverage rates). The final column estimates the 
percentage of poor households among households receiving exemptions (so-called targeting 
                                                 
11
 Survey conducted by consultants, 65 households were interviewed in November 2005.  
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rate12). A programme that has poor poverty targeting will have low coverage and targeting 
rates. Table 20 indicates that only 23.7% of the poor and crop-growing households were 
exempted from the agricultural land use tax in 2002. The percentage of exempted 
households among the food-poor households was higher, at 37.6%. However, this rate was 
still low since there were a large proportion of the poor and very poor who had to pay this 
tax. However the programme had relatively good targeting of poverty. Among the 
beneficiary households, 75.1% were poor13.  
 






Coverage to  
food poor 
households  




1. Red River Delta 17.8 33.7 66.1 
2. North East 24.0 34.5 80.3 
3. North West 29.4 34.8 94.0 
4. North Central Coast 29.4 44.4 83.1 
5. South Central Coast 23.2 37.4 76.7 
6. Central Highlands 28.9 41.1 88.4 
7. North East South 19.3 33.1 50.8 
8. Mekong River Delta 18.3 30.7 53.6 
All Vietnam 23.7 37.6 75.1 
Note: No information in VHLSS 2004 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 2002 
 
Table 21 estimates exemptions for education fees and contributions from households for the 
2002-2004 period. Households who received the reduction and exemption are classified by 
the commune authorities, ethnic minorities, those located in remote areas, and households 
with special difficulties. It shows that the percentage of poor households who had someone 
attending school and received support was 26.8% in 2002 and this increased to 40.8% in 
2004. There were also 58.5% of food poor households receiving reduction and exemption 
in 2004. One explanation for the increase in the coverage rate is the reduction in the 
number of the poor households.  
 
                                                 
12
 In fact, the rate that is equal to 100 minus this rate is called the leakage rate. This indicator measures the 
percentage of non-poor households who received support from the programme over the total number of 
recipients.    
13
 It should be noted that although Government policy was land-use tax exemption for the poor, the poverty 
line for the period 2000-2005 was based on income. Thus, the poverty rate was lower than one based on the 
expenditure poverty line prepared by GSO-WB. In this report, the expenditure poverty line is used.  
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However, the poverty targeting of the programme were not good in 2004. Non-poor 
households represented 51.3% of beneficiaries. In some richer regions, such as the Red 
River Delta and North East South, the programme seemed to target the non-poor instead of 
the poor. For example, in the Red River Delta there were only 15.7% of poor households 
(with school age children) receiving the reduction or exemption in 2004. Of all households 
who benefited only 31.3% were poor households, while 68.7% were the non-poor 
households. An explanation for this might be that there was a proportion of households who 
were poor in 2002 but escaped poverty and became non-poor in 2004 but still received 
support. Thus, the coverage rate of the programme was increased, but the targeting rate of 
the programme was reduced.         
 
Table 21: Percentage of households with school children who received reduction or 
exemption for education fee and contributions 




Coverage to  
food poor 
households  







Coverage to  
food poor 
households  




1. Red River Delta 9.0 17.7 54.7 15.7 14.9 31.3 
2. North East 36.5 48.0 63.4 48.6 61.4 55.1 
3. North West 35.6 39.6 77.7 56.9 59.0 69.6 
4. North Central Coast 20.0 28.6 68.3 31.8 49.4 65.2 
5. South Central Coast 28.6 48.8 68.7 38.4 64.0 57.8 
6. Central Highlands 50.5 58.5 70.4 86.3 96.9 56.1 
7. North East South 30.1 44.6 38.2 56.3 83.4 21.7 
8. Mekong River Delta 28.6 34.2 52.2 35.5 54.6 34.6 
All Vietnam 26.8 38.8 61.6 40.8 58.5 48.7 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 2002-2004 
 
Table 22 estimates the coverage and targeting rates for the provision of the healthcare 
insurance for poor households in 2002 and 2004. Similar to the trend in the education sub-
programme, the coverage rates of the healthcare insurance program increased during 2002-
2004, but the targeting rate significantly decreased. Among the beneficiaries, poor 
households accounted for only 44.9%, while non-poor households accounted for 55.1%. 
This is concrete evidence that the current contribution mechanism is not pro-poor even in 






Table 22: Percentage of households who receive free healthcare insurance card 




Coverage to  
food poor 
households  







Coverage to  
food poor 
households  




1. Red River Delta 9.3 19.6 65.8 17.9 25.4 38.1 
2. North East 7.8 11.4 79.7 29.9 39.4 50.8 
3. North West 16.0 20.6 94.3 49.0 52.2 66.6 
4. North Central Coast 10.1 14.5 80.0 20.8 25.5 59.9 
5. South Central Coast 15.4 19.4 63.8 26.5 47.6 51.8 
6. Central Highlands 8.6 14.0 87.0 30.2 27.4 50.9 
7. North East South 12.5 17.0 28.4 20.4 24.4 14.7 
8. Mekong River Delta 9.5 16.8 63.4 10.1 17.9 24.4 
All Vietnam 10.2 16.0 66.6 23.5 33.0 44.9 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 2002-2004 
 
5.   Conclusions 
 
Major variations in social, economic and geographic conditions across the different regions 
in Vietnam make it difficult to develop generic responses to the problem of pro-poor labour 
contributions. Some factors were more important in some areas and less important in 
others. For example, there are stark differences in the problems faced by Khmer 
communities in Soc Trang, and the problems faced by the poor resettled on state organized 
housing in Son La. In addition there were major differences within any particular area 
depending on factors such as gender, ethnic group, age and history of settlement. The most 
vulnerable groups included displaced communities that had been resettled, ethnic 
minorities, women and aged and young, newly established households. However, despite 
these variations, by combining analysis of the data with discussions with stakeholders, 
conclusion and key recommendations were identified.  
 
Many of the conclusion and recommendations are focused at commune level. This is the 
weakest link in the system, and it is here that officials must interact with the poor and try to 
resolve problems.  
 
The Labour Law is not representing the interests of villagers under 15 years and villagers 
that do not have a written or verbal contract with the contractor. This places the poor at 
increased risk. It is often poor families who cannot afford to send their children to 
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secondary school and critically need the income that these children could secure. It is 
illegal for children under 15 years to work in the market and so it is important that 
alternative policy is developed where under 15 children are not in the market but are given 
government assistance to support their well-being. The poor are more income dependent on 
local project work than other groups and often do not participate in decisions about 
contributions. Consequently, they are more vulnerable to exploitation by commune officials 
and contractors. The Labour Law needs to respond to these gaps. This includes: 
a. An awareness campaign is needed for the officials or contractors who prepare and 
implement public investment projects and programmes on the national labour 
standards including remuneration conditions and recruitment modalities. It is 
imperative that the 5% or 10% local labour contribution clause is carried out to 
maintain or increase the income of the poor (either via preferential access to paid 
work or via exemption from voluntary contribution).  
b. Access to information in the villages so that the poor understand their rights 
according to national labour standards. Workers compensation is a key issue.   
c. Monitoring and enforcement when applying national labour standards by 
officials/project. Commune level officials should be encouraged to intervene and 
even stop work if the Labour Law is not being applied and the agreed level of local 
labourers are not paid. 
d. Transparency and accountability in management and operations of projects in the 
communes will promote incentives for the poor to contribute labour  
e. Decisions about whether labour should be paid or not for infrastructure construction 
needs to a community based decision not just a few key village and commune 
leaders. This involves Grassroots Democracy. 
f. In the case that the poor need to voluntarily contribute their labour, there needs to be 
a range of incentives that they can clearly identify. They need to know exactly how 
contributing their labour will benefit them.  
g. Organised field visits by officials and villagers to communities that have developed 
participatory and pro-poor contribution mechanisms.  
 
Contributions might become a burden on local communities and result in some households 
with little scope to deal with economic shock and natural calamities. It is important to bear 
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in mind that these programmes are targeted at the poor, so raising contributions from local 
households raises the risk of further impoverishing people living with incomes below the 
national average. There is a critical need for clarification of the role and framework for 
local and household contributions.  
 
One key policy target during the next stage of the national programmes for poverty 
reduction is the incremental increase of commune ownership over the identification, 
selection and construction of state sponsored infrastructure14. The process to achieve this 
target needs to be explicitly linked to improved community participation in decisions 
about investment priorities and contribution schemes. A main issue is that even if the 
commune is the investment owner, if the community is not part of the decision-making 
process then the impact of infrastructure will be significantly affected. What is the 
difference if district officials decide to build a road or market in one commune or commune 
officials make the decision. If the people who would use it are not consulted the result will 
be the same, lack of impact and wasted opportunity. The construction of local markets is a 
good example. The Vietnamese media have identified a lack of community participation in 
decisions to prioritise the construction of local markets. The result has been that many 
districts decided that local markets were the best investment for the commune. In practice, 
many of these markets are seldom used. If commune officials also use this method of 
decision-making without having full discussion of the pros and cons with villagers, the 
result will be the same - empty local markets.  
 
Increased commune ownership and participatory processes in decisions will mean increased 
resources mobilized. Accounting routines need be simplified for villages and communes to 
comply. It is important that household contributions are recorded in full. The present 
system is not transparent. Guidelines are needed from the province that outline instructions 
for national labour and contribution schemes for districts and communes to help ensure that 
household contributions are raised fairly.  
 
Communes are also using procedures for design/costing regulations and bidding and 
contracting regulations meant for larger contractors and departments, for example Decrees 
                                                 
14
 According to the P135, commune ownership will rise 50% by 2008 and 100% by 2010.  
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52 and 88. These are inappropriate for what is necessary at this level. The province needs to 
issue guidelines that are appropriate for capacities at commune level and provide sufficient 
information to district and province levels.  
 
Decentralisation must consider the different types of schemes that are constructed in 
communes. Many are complex and capacity in the commune is not yet available for 
construction and O&M, without technical support from higher levels. In cases of complex 
design, district needs to continue preparing design and supporting implementation.  
 
The present system calculates household contributions using fixed percentages applied 
uniformly to all types of infrastructure across all communes. In this system, the 
contributions of the poor are high compared to relative income. The system should be 
replaced by a flexible system that calculates contributions using prevailing socio-economic 
conditions and specific for the requirements of different types of infrastructure. For 
instance, it is likely that the more economically active members of the community will get 
more benefit from roads that will enable them to take products to market, whereas poor 
people in more remote areas will use the road less. This will ensure that contributions are 
practical and do not disadvantage some groups in the community, such as the poor. 
Grassroots Democracy regulations to decide the appropriate level and type of contributions 
is preferred at the scheme selection and planning stage.  
 
Stronger efforts are required to promote a sense of local ownership of projects by involving 
the community more fully in the selection, design and construction, and management of 
schemes.  Explicit links are needed between contributions, decisions and financial 
contributions. 
 
The interests of local people to be consulted, informed or be involved in direct decision-
making is often limited to instances that are in their direct interest. People participate more 
actively if the activity affects their livelihoods immediately, and when their labour or 
financial contribution is required. Infrastructure projects and credit scheme activities are at 
the top of their lists. Incentives are required to encourage poor and non-poor villagers to 
contribute to their own socio-economic development. These include the following options:  
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a. Commune/ village and beneficiaries have complete control over the finances of the 
scheme. The process of allocating budget, award of contracts and signing of 
agreements, liquidation of investment and handover for O&M follows a very 
transparent process. Complicated reporting and record keeping is avoided. The 
procedures for formulation of proposals, approvals, and release of funds are simple and 
quick. Rigid regulations governing the purpose and modalities if the use of the 
commune budget inhibits participation and beneficiaries quickly lose interest.  
b. Effective community participation by poor and non-poor in investment identification, 
design, cost estimate preparation, decisions whether construction is carried out by the 
community or contractor. In the case of a contractor, the contract is between the 
commune/village and contractor, who reports to commune/village on quality of 
construction and financial issues.  
c. The utilization of local skilled and unskilled employment is a priority and a standard 
clause in the contract. Workers conditions accord with the National Labour Law. The 
poor are given preference in paid labour opportunities with district level monitoring 
how this policy is implemented. In the case of voluntary contributions of labour, the 
very poor are exempted or the contribution is lessened. The district level would also 
enforce the policy and impose sanctions and penalties such as the withholding of funds, 
if commune officials do not implement the policy.  
d. All savings against the estimated cost are retained by the commune/village and 
participatory methods used to decide the purpose for the savings.  
e. Level of household contribution is not prescribed and is negotiated during community 
meetings.  Contributions reflect the nature and complexity of each investment.   
f. Create the conditions to improve the development of the private sector in the local 
economy. Developing small household-based businesses provide employment 
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 1998   2002   2004  
Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total 
Poorest 1158.5 1231.8 1160.1 1329.3 1398.5 1331.4 1607.9 1737.8 1612.5 
Near Poorest 1683.9 1686.0 1683.9 1951.7 1972.3 1953.1 2490.5 2554.3 2495.7 
Middle 2176.0 2183.4 2176.6 2571.3 2632.2 2578.8 3376.3 3417.5 3382.6 
Near Richest 2980.8 3083.3 3005.0 3619.0 3777.7 3665.0 4801.9 5025.1 4868.9 
Richest 4997.7 7327.5 6463.4 6246.6 8895.8 8030.6 8368.4 10696.2 10025.4 
Total 2263.5 5598.5 2959.7 2736.1 6644.6 3756.8 3484.0 7885.5 4684.4 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSS 1998-2002-2004 
 
 
 
